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A major development in recent decades in industrialised countries is the decline in national savings rates. Over 
the same period, the labour’s share of national income has also declined in many industrialised countries. This 
paper seeks to provide a unified account of these developments. We show that globalization, in the form of 
increased capital mobility, provides incentives to implement labour market reforms that raise the returns to 
capital and improve efficiency. Nevertheless, in a world where aggregate savings reflect life-cycle motives and 
are mainly performed out of labour income, the associated fall in the labour share reduces aggregate savings and 
the pace of capital accumulation. This inefficient outcome is due to competition for capital between countries 
generating negative externalities. 
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It is often argued that, in the long-run, deeper economic integration makes everybody better
oﬀ. The reason is that the beneﬁts from economic integration due to a more eﬃcient allocation
of resources emerge in the long-run, while the costs due to sectoral reallocations mainly accrue
in the short-run. Still, in the real world we observe persistent opposition to openness and to
the so-called globalization process (Rodrik, 1997). While this may be partly due to the
slow and painful restructuring processes of the Western economies, this paper identiﬁes, as
an additional potential cause, a channel through which the long-run gains from economic
integration may be partly dissipated. In particular, we show that economic integration may
negatively aﬀect capital accumulation, via endogenous labour market regulation.
We construct a tractable dynamic general equilibrium model where the degree of capi-
tal mobility aﬀects the endogenously determined degree of labour market imperfections that
have, in turn, a bearing on capital accumulation. We explain labour market institutions as
the outcome of a stylized political mechanism, where rational agents make political choices
taking into account both the degree of capital mobility and the dynamic eﬀects of their choices
on capital accumulation. In this framework, increased capital mobility provides incentives to
implement labour market reforms that reduce the share of output accruing to labour and
increase the share of output accruing to capital. Although this improves labour market eﬃ-
ciency, in a world where aggregate savings reﬂect life-cycle motives and are mainly performed
out of labour income, a drop in the labour share reduces the pace of capital accumulation,
the steady state capital stock, and the steady state lifetime utility.
The implications of the model are consistent with the observed patterns of labour market
reforms, labour’s shares and savings rates in western economies. A wave of labour market
reforms has swept over much of the industrialised countries, especially since the 1990s. Even
though in many countries the reform process has not been smooth and uncontroversial, the
evidence (Bertola and Boeri, 2001 and Nickell, 2003) suggests that most reforms went in the
direction of reducing price and quantity rigidities in the labour market. At the same time, it is
well-known from the work of Blanchard (1996) and Poterba (1997) that over the last decades
the labour’s share of GDP has declined both in Europe and in the US. Only few studies have
investigated the determinants of the movements in labour’s share. Among these, Harrison
(2002) ﬁnds that, controlling for various contemporaneous factors, measures of globalization
(such as trade shares, exchange rate crises, movements in foreign investment, capital controls)
have a negative eﬀect on the share of GDP that accrues to labour. Guscina (2006) and Jayadev
(2007) share the same conclusions. The ﬁnal piece of evidence consistent with the predictions
of the model concerns the decline in savings rates observed in most European countries, US
and Japan over the same time span. Table 1 (from Jappelli and Padula, 2007) shows that
savings rates fell dramatically in the 80’s and 90’s, with the notable exception of Norway.
Even though in some countries savings rates increased back in the early years 2000, they are
21980 1990 2000 2004
Austria 13.2 14 8.3 7.8
Belgium 20.3 18 13.4 14.1
Denmark n.a. 11.2 4.8 6.1
Finland 4.1 2.2 -0.9 1.3
France 12.1 7.8 10.8 12.1
Germany 13.4 13.9 9.8 10.8
Ireland 12.1 8.5 10.7 15.1
Italy 25 25.5 12.4 13.9
Netherlands 7.8 11.6 6.7 10.8
Norway 1.5 0.8 4.5 5.9
Spain 11.1 12.3 10.6 10.2
Sweden 7.9 0 2.4 6.8
UK 12.4 8 4.3 5.8
Japan 19.9 14 9.8 5.8
US 10.2 7.8 2.8 4.8
Table 1: Household savings rates. Table from Jappelli and Padula (2007)
generally still well below the 1980 levels.
Thus, the model nicely explains these so far unrelated pieces of evidence in an uniﬁed
framework. It does so by means of a standard dynamic, general equilibrium, overlapping
generations model in which parents and their children are linked by bequests. The households
save for retirement and possibly to leave bequests to their children. We assume that a wage
ﬂoor may be imposed by a central authority, whose preferences over the wage policy are
given by a convex combination of the preferences of the young and the old. We provide
conditions for a binding wage policy to arise in a closed economy steady state and show that,
in this context, a binding wage ﬂoor increases the labour share. As in the model savings
are determined by life-cycle reasons and are therefore ﬁnanced by labour income, a higher
labour share spurs capital accumulation, provided that savings decisions are not too elastic
with respect to the interest rate. We show that for plausible parameters values labour market
regulation, though reducing the allocative eﬃciency on the labour market, raises the steady
state welfare of the current young and of all future generations thanks to the positive eﬀect
on capital accumulation.1
Closed economy results provide an useful benchmark against which we compare the open
economy analysis, characterized by full capital mobility and no labour mobility. In this setting,
1Relatedly, Uhlig and Yanagawa (1996) shows that raising the labour share in an endogenous growth OLG
model leads to faster growth. Bertola (1996) provides an elegant extension of their results to the perpetual
youth OLG model.
3international capital ﬂows take place if wages – and hence the returns to capital – are diﬀerent
across countries.
We consider the case of two countries strategically interacting with each other and playing
a non-cooperative game. In this framework, competition for the services of capital makes
symmetric regulated equilibria not sustainable because, in each country, agents have incen-
tives to slightly undercut the rival’s wage in order to attract foreign capital. The intensity of
competition for capital determines whether a symmetric fully competitive or an asymmetric
steady state arises. The intensity of competition for capital, in turn, depends on the elas-
ticity of the demand for capital. For a given interest rate diﬀerential, the size of the capital
movements increases with the elasticity of the demand for capital.
If competition for capital is intense, the steady state is symmetric and no binding wage
ﬂoor is implemented in any of the two countries, because of the substantial capital outﬂows
triggered by any unilateral introduction of a wage ﬂoor. In this case, the steady state lifetime
utility of the households is lower than in the closed economy where the binding wage ﬂoor
allows to accumulate a larger capital stock
If the demand for capital is relatively inelastic, capital ﬂows are relatively small and labour
market regulation, though more costly than in the closed economy case, is still aﬀordable.
The steady state equilibrium is then asymmetric with one country having no binding wage
ﬂoor (and full employment) and the other retaining a binding wage ﬂoor (and unemployment).
However, the beneﬁts of higher wages spill over to both countries thanks to capital movements
that equalize factor prices. In other words, the capital ﬂows from the regulated country boost
the demand for labour in the unregulated country and make its domestic minimum wage
not binding. As a result, the unregulated country enjoys the same wage as the regulated
economy without experiencing unemployment. The lifetime utility of the households living in
the regulated country is lower than in the closed economy case, because of the larger cost of
labour market regulation. On the contrary, the households living in the unregulated country
may be better oﬀ provided that the elasticity of the demand for capital is low enough and,
consequently, wages are high enough.2
This paper is related to two streams of literature. First, it is related to the large body
of literature analysing the eﬀects of economic integration on economic outcomes. Bertocchi
(2003) analyses the eﬀects of full capital mobility on income and wages in the context of an
OLG model. In her setting, where the degree of labour market imperfections is taken as
exogenous, openness is always beneﬁcial, even though factor shares may fail to converge. The
present paper, where labour market regulation is endogenous, shows that the long-run beneﬁts
of deeper economic integration should be weighted against the long-run cost of a slower pace
of capital accumulation.3
2The asymmetric response to market integration in regulated and unregulated economies also appears in
the trade model of Davis (1998).
3This literature also includes, among others, Bean et al (1998), Beissinger (2001), Krueger (2002), Rodrik
(1997), Krugman (1997), Naylor (1998), Zhao (1995), Danthine and Hunt (1994).
4Second, this paper is related to the stream of literature that dates back to Wright (1986)
and analyses the political economy of labour market institutions in a dynamic framework.
Typically, in this literature, labour market rigidities arise in political equilibria either because
they allow to extract (or protect) rents due to underlying microeconomic frictions (Saint-Paul,
2000), or as a second-best option under ﬁnancial market imperfections by providing risk-averse
workers with insurance against labour market risks that laissez-faire arrangements may be
unable to supply.4 In this paper, instead, labour market regulation arises from workers’
attempts to increase their share of output at the expenses of the capital’s share of output.
As workers become capitalists in the second period of life, they are willing to regulate the
labour market only if it allows to shift resources over time at better terms than the market
and consequently it allows to increase their permanent income. Moreover, unlike most of
the literature dealing with the political economy of labour market institutions, this paper
acknowledges the eﬀect of economic integration on the political choices of the agents and let
countries strategically interact among each other when regulating national labour markets.5
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 illustrates the fundamentals of the
model economy. Section 3 characterizes the closed economy political steady state. Section 4
explores the open economy and section 5 concludes.
2 The model
We consider two countries, the home country and the foreign country, and analyse their inter-
action within a simple variant of the standard overlapping generations model with production.
We refer to the domestic country, the description of the foreign country being completely anal-
ogous.
2.1 Households
A new generation of agents is born every period. Agents live two periods. There is no
population growth and one representative agent per generation. When young the agent is
endowed with λ units of time and when old his or her time endowment is 1 − λ. Income per
unit of time is denoted by y. Preferences are assumed to be time separable, with a constant
discount factor. The utility from consumption in each period is given by u(ct) = c
1−φ
t /(1−φ).
The parents derive utility from leaving a bequest bt to their children: ν(bt) = ψ×b
1−φ
t /(1−φ),
where the term ψ reﬂects the parent’s concern about leaving bequests to her children. This
type of bequest motive has been called warm glow, and was ﬁrst introduced by Andreoni
4See Hassler and Rodr´ ıguez Mora (1999) and Hassler et al. (2005) for a political economy approach and
Bertola (2004), Acemoglu and Shimer (1999), Dr` eze and Gollier (1993) for an approach with exogenous labour
institutions.
5Accounting for strategic interaction in a two-country framework has proved useful also in the analysis of
the political economy of ﬁscal policy as in Persson and Tabellini (1992) and Perotti (2001). For a survey on
tax competition for mobile capital see Wilson (1999).
5(1989). Agents are allowed to invest their savings both at home and abroad. Capital mobility
is perfect.
Agents maximize the present discounted value of their lifetime utility and have perfect
foresight. Thus, the problem of a young consumer in the home country, labelling foreign



















t + st = λyt + bt (2)
bt+1 + co







+ (1 − ηt+1)(1 + rt+1)

(3)
ηt+1 ∈ [0,1] (4)
where c
y
t, st and bt denote, respectively, consumption when young, savings, and bequests at
time t. The domestic and foreign (net) interest rates are denoted respectively by rt+1 and
r∗
t+1. Finally, ηt+1 is the share of savings invested abroad and θ is the rate at which individuals
discount the future.
2.2 Firms
An aggregate good Q is produced in each country by means of a Cobb-Douglas technology
that makes use of labour N and capital K. The (net) production function is
Q = KγN1−γ − δK
where δ ∈ [0,1] is the depreciation rate of capital. There is free entry in the market and ﬁrms
take prices as given. When the economy is closed, ﬁrms’ conditional demand schedules for
labour and capital are standard:














with w and r denoting the domestic wage and interest rate. In the case of full capital mobility,
the relevant interest rate is the smallest between the foreign and the domestic rate.
2.3 The labour market
As a binding wage regulation may be introduced in the economy, the labour market may not
clear and unemployment may occur.6
6Of course, labour market regulations involve a number of diﬀerent policies (such as employment protection,
unemployment beneﬁts, minimum wages and centralised bargaining) that have diﬀerent eﬀects on labour market
outcomes. However, at least to some extent they all contribute to set a ﬂoor to the wage rate. Minimum wages
6To simplify matters, we think of each household as a very large extended family which
contains a continuum of members with names on the unit interval. In equilibrium, some
members will be unemployed and others employed. To avoid within-cohort distributional
issues not arising from heterogeneity in the factor content of agents’ income, following Merz
(1995) and Andolfatto (1996), we assume that family members perfectly insure each other
against ﬂuctuations in consumption.7
We also maintain that unemployed workers have available an alternative production tech-
nology with constant labour productivity U. In the paper, we will refer to this technology as
home production.
Given the capital stock K, the equilibrium in the labour market characterizes as follows.






the minimum level of capital that clears the labour market at the wage w, i.e. b K (w) is such
that N (K,w) = 1, for all K ≥ b K (w). Then, the labour market is in one of the two following
regimes.
1. Full-Employment Regime. If the capital stock is large enough, namely K ≥ b K (w),
the labour market clears and labour income equals the market clearing wage: y =
wc (K) ≡ (1 − γ)Kγ. From equation (6), the interest rate is r(K) = γKγ−1 − δ.
Nobody makes use of the home production technology since U ≤ w ≤ wc (K).
2. Unemployment Regime. If the capital stock is low enough, namely K < b K (w),
the minimum wage is larger than the competitive wage, i.e. w > wc (K), and the
employment level is pinned down by the labour demand N (K,w). In this regime, a
proportion N(K,w) of agents (within each household) work in the ﬁrm, and a proportion
(1 − N (K,w)) work in the backyard. Thus, the labour income per unit of time of a
representative household is:






(w − U) + U (7)
Notice that, taking capital as given, the labour income is increasing in w as long as
the wage is lower than U
1−γ, which is, incidentally, the level at which a monopoly union
would set the wage.
Finally, it is worth noting that using (5) and (6), the interest rate can be expressed as
in an obvious way. Unemployment beneﬁts by raising workers’ reservation wage. Employment protection and
centralised bargaining by raising workers’ bargaining power. We discuss an extension of the model that allows
for more than one policy instrument in section 4.1.
7 We abstract from any source of within-cohort heterogeneity that may introduce additional reasons for
labour market regulation to arise. For instance, the presence of insiders/outsiders conﬂicts and/or of unin-
surable labour market risk may cloud the analysis by making it more diﬃcult to disentangle the diﬀerent









Equation (8) describes the demand side of the capital market and boils down to the usual
expression r(K) = γKγ−1 − δ when the wage rate is at the competitive level, i.e. w =
wc (K) ≡ (1 − γ)Kγ, and there is full employment, i.e. N = 1. Thus, given w, the demand
for capital is ﬂat for K < b K, and decreasing afterwards. When the minimum wage is binding
any increase in K is matched by an identical increase in the employment level N, that leaves
the capital-labour ratio constant and allows the ﬁrm’s FOCs to be satisﬁed at the same prices
w and r. Thus, in the unemployment regime, changes in K do not alter the capital-labour
ratio and leave the interest rate unchanged.
3 Closed economy
This section discusses the closed economy case. It ﬁrst oﬀers an analytical solution for the
baseline version of the model where the young work and the old are retired (λ = 1), utility is
logarithmic (φ = 1) and no bequests are allowed for (ψ = 0). This is the simplest setting to
analyse whether labour market regulation may endogenously arise from the political conﬂict
between the owners of diﬀerent factors of production and has the merit of being simple enough
to deliver a transparent analytical solution. In this baseline case there is a one-to-one relation
between agents’ age and the factor content of agents’ income. Therefore young agents will be
often referred to as “workers” and old agents as “capitalists”.
Subsection 3.2 will solve the model numerically allowing for a general CRRA utility func-
tion, a less restrictive inter-temporal timing of factor income and a less restrictive intra-
temporal allocation of factor income.
3.1 Baseline model
We ﬁrst solve for the economic equilibrium (subsection 3.1.1), where the policy variable is
taken as exogenous, and then turn to the political equilibrium (subsection 3.1.2) where the
policy is chosen taking the state variable of the economy, the capital stock, as given. Finally,
we solve for the political steady state where the economic and political equilibria are mutually
consistent.
3.1.1 The economic equilibrium
In this section, we analyse the agents’ private decisions taking as given the political outcomes.
In particular, we take the sequence of future wages as exogenous and analyse their eﬀect on
agents’ behaviour. A formal deﬁnition of the (closed economy) economic equilibrium follows.
Deﬁnition 1. Given an initial capital stock K0 and a sequence of wages {wt}
∞
t=0, an economic





t=0 and factor prices {rt}
∞
t=0, such
8that, in every period,
1. consumers maximize their lifetime utility;
2. ﬁrms maximize proﬁts, i.e. (5) and (6) hold;
3. employment is determined by (5);
4. capital and goods markets clear, i.e. Kt+1 = s(wt,Kt) for all t.
Assuming φ = 1, λ = 1 and ψ = 0, and given that capital is not allowed to ﬂow across
countries, the consumer’s maximization problem (1) subject to (2), (3) and (4) delivers the
standard saving function st = 1





y (Kt,wt) ∀t (9)
Given wt, in each period the labour market is in the Unemployment or Full-Employment
Regime depending on the level of the capital stock. If Kt ≥ b K (wt) full-employment ob-
tains. Viceversa, if Kt < b K (wt), the economy is in the unemployment regime. Hence, the













γ (wt − U) + U

if Kt < b K (wt)
1
2+θ (1 − γ)K
γ
t if Kt ≥ b K (wt)
(10)
Since we will conﬁne our analysis to the steady state, we only analyse the stationary economic
equilibrium where, given a constant minimum wage w, the capital stock is constant as well.8
Lemma 1. The stationary economic equilibrium characterizes as follows:
1. If the minimum wage is low enough, i.e. w ≤ wc  
KF

















1−γ, the economy is in the
unemployment regime and the capital stock is given by:
KA (w) =
U





γ (w − U)
> 0







, and increasing in U.
Proof. In appendix.
8For the sake of notational simplicity, in what follows we make a slight abuse of notation, and denote
w





9If the competitive wage, evaluated at the stationary competitive capital stock KF and
denoted by wc  
KF
, is larger than the regulated wage, a full-employment equilibrium arises.
In other words, the competitive stationary capital stock KF is large enough to make the
minimum wage not binding. Therefore, the labour market clears.
Diﬀerently, if the minimum wage is larger than the full employment equilibrium wage,
unemployment occurs. In this case the equilibrium capital stock depends on the minimum
wage in a non monotonic fashion. In particular, it is increasing in the minimum wage if the







) and decreasing otherwise. The reason is
that the aggregate labour income is increasing in w if w is lower than U
1−γ, and decreasing
otherwise (see equation (7)). Hence, both aggregate savings and the capital stock have the
same shape. Of course, in the unemployment regime the capital stock is increasing in the
home production productivity U. The higher U, the higher both the aggregate labour income
and savings, and the higher the capital stock.
We now turn to the determination of the political equilibrium.
3.1.2 The political equilibrium
So far, the wage rate has been taken as exogenous. In this section, we determine w as the
endogenous outcome of a political mechanism. We now describe the political process through
which the minimum wage is implemented.
The timing according to which life unfolds is as follows. At the beginning of period t a
minimum wage wt is agreed upon. Together with the existing capital stock Kt, this determines
the labour demand N (Kt,wt). If the minimum wage is binding, unemployment occurs and
the interest rate r(wt) is as described in equation (8). Finally, at the beginning of period t+1
the wage wt+1 is set and savings are invested.
Given the risk sharing arrangement within households, in this economy heterogeneity is
solely driven by age. Preferences upon wt are shaped by the value functions of the young (the
workers) and the old (the capitalists), denoted respectively by V y (.) and V o (.):




V o (wt;Kt) = lnco (wt,Kt) = lnKt (1 + r(wt)) (12)
where cy (wt,Kt) – ﬁrst period consumption – does not depend on the wage of period t + 1
due to the log utility assumption that makes it independent of the interest rate.
As to the political process, we maintain that both workers and capitalists are able to inter-
vene in the political arena and aﬀect political outcomes, possibly exerting lobbying activities
left unmodeled for simplicity. We capture this assumption by introducing a political aggre-
gator given by the convex combination of the lifetime preferences of capitalists and workers.
The weights reﬂect the relative political power of each group. The political aggregator reads
as follows:
W (wt;wt+1,Kt) = αV y (wt;wt+1,Kt) + (1 − α)V o (wt;Kt) (13)
10where α ∈ [0,1]. The function W (wt;wt+1,Kt) describes the preference mapping on wt of
the society, given the expectations on wt+1 and the capital stock Kt.
Agents choose over constant policy sequences, i.e. the wage is set once-and-for-all. This
choice allows to get transparent analytical results. Section (3.1.3) discusses the extension
of the analysis to an environment characterized by repeated voting. While dynamic voting
complicates the analysis, the main results of the paper carry over to this extension.
We now provide formal deﬁnitions of the political equilibrium and of the political steady
state, denoting the capital stock in place when the political decision is to be made by K0:
Deﬁnition 2. For each given level of the capital stock, a political equilibrium is a function
e w(K0) that maximizes the political aggregator on the set of feasible wages.9 Formally:
e w(K0) = arg max
w∈Ω(K0)
W (w;K0)
In a political equilibrium capital is taken as given. In steady state, however, the capital
stock is endogenous and depends on the wage rate (via economic equilibrium). Therefore, a
wage wA is a steady state wage if and only if it generates a capital stock level KA  
wA
such
that, given KA  
wA
, the wage wA maximizes the political aggregator. Formally:






We now turn to the analysis of the conﬂict of interests between workers and capitalists.
Preferences over the minimum wage
Before discussing the outcome of the political process, let us analyse the preferences of
workers and capitalists separately. Let us rewrite the value functions (11) and (12) as follows:













V o (w;K0) = lnK0 (1 + r(w)) (15)
where y (w,K0) and r(w) are given by (7) and (8) in the unemployment regime and by the
competitive prices in the full-employment regime. Lemma 2 establishes the conditions under
which a conﬂict of interest emerges between workers and capitalists, i.e. under which the
young want to raise the wage above the old most preferred level.
Lemma 2. Given the existing capital stock K0, there exists a conﬂict of interest between
workers and capitalists if and only if:
• The economy is dynamically eﬃcient, i.e. γ ≥ δ
2+θ+δ,




9See appendix A for the formal deﬁnition of the feasibility requirement.





The intuition is as follows. Capitalists live oﬀ their savings. The higher the interest rate,
the happier they are. Given the negative relation between wages and the interest rate (see
equation (8)), capitalists always dislike high wages.
On the contrary, workers face a trade-oﬀ and may support the introduction of a minimum
wage. The above proposition tells us that three conditions are needed for this to be true. First,
the economy must be dynamically eﬃcient. This implies that the (competitive) stationary
capital stock is lower than the level that maximizes aggregate consumption or, equivalently,
that the net interest rate is positive.10
In this case, it is well-known that the current young (and all future) generations are better
oﬀ if, in each period, resources are transferred from the old to the young in a lump sum fashion,
i.e. the reverse of a social security scheme is implemented.11 Absent other non-distortionary
tools, the introduction of a binding minimum wage mimics this scheme, as it raises the labour
(ﬁrst period) income and decreases the interest rate (second period income).
The binding minimum wage, however, introduces ineﬃciencies in the labour market. The
second condition takes care of the size of the eﬃciency losses. If U is suﬃciently high, i.e.
U ≥ U, the fall in aggregate production is not high enough, from the point of view of the
young, to outweigh the gains that derive from the introduction of a minimum wage.




is more technical and is required by the once-
and-for-all wage setting assumption. It makes sure that workers’ preferred wage is feasible
i.e. it is binding in steady state.
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]
Figure 1 depicts the conﬂict of interest. The dashed-dotted line represents the minimum
constant wage implementable in steady state as a function of K0. Capitalists always support
the lowest possible wage, and therefore their preferred wage is represented precisely by the
dashed-dotted line. The solid line represents workers’ preferred feasible wage wy (K0,U),
which turns out to be non decreasing in K0.
If K0 is low enough, namely lower than K0 (U), the feasibility constraint is binding and
the feasible wage chosen by the young is the competitive wage wc  
KF
that would emerge
in a competitive steady state. As K0 goes up, the preferred wage of the young increases
because – from equation (7) – the elasticity of income with respect to the wage goes up as
10In this setting, the condition for a dynamically eﬃcient economy, i.e. γ ≥
δ
2+θ+δ, is satisﬁed for empirically
plausible parameter values (see table 2 in section 3.2). Moreover, according to Abel et al. (1989), western
economies are likely to be dynamically eﬃcient.
11The reason is that the market transfers resources from the second to the ﬁrst period at a rate equal to
1
1+r, while the reverse of the social security scheme provides a rate equal to 1. Thus, if r > 0, the latter scheme
raises the permanent income of the young and makes them better oﬀ.





young agents support a wage larger than the one supported by
the old and a conﬂict of interest exists.
As K0 grows larger the conﬂict must eventually disappear, because the competitive wage
goes up and becomes larger than the monopoly union wage U
1−γ, while the wage supported
by the young is always smaller than the static monopoly wage.
Autarchic political equilibrium
Having described the preferences of the two types of agents, the characterization of the
political equilibrium is immediate. The political aggregator, given by a convex combination
of the preferences of the workers and the capitalists, looks as follows:









ln(1 + r(w)) (16)
where A = αln 1+θ
2+θ − α 1
1+θ ln(2 + θ) + (1 − α)lnK0 does not depend on the wage.
Figure 2 depicts the wage that maximizes (16), denoted by e w(K0,U,α) and fully char-
acterized in appendix A (lemma 3). Figure 2 and ﬁgure 1 are obviously identical if workers






– where binding regulation takes place – becomes narrower and
e w(K0,U,α) shifts down. The same happens as U goes down.
[FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE]
3.1.3 The steady state
In steady state the economic equilibrium and the political equilibrium must be mutually
consistent. Figure 3 depicts both the economic and the political equilibria, i.e. the schedules
KA (w) and e w(K,U,α). The unique steady state lies at the point where e w(K,U,α) and
KA (w) cross. Proposition 1 characterizes the steady state wage.
[FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE]














1. The steady state wage wA (U,α) is larger than the wage that would arise in a fully
competitive OLG economy;
2. Workers’ lifetime utility is larger in the regulated steady state than in the fully compet-
itive steady state.
Proof. In appendix.
13Proposition 1 ﬁrst spells out the conditions under which a binding minimum wage is
implemented in steady state. The ﬁrst requires that workers have enough political power.
The second that the economy is dynamically eﬃcient. The third that U is high enough.
These conditions, and their economic intuition, follow directly from lemma 2 that states that
workers are in favour of a binding wage regulation only if the economy is dynamically eﬃcient
and unemployment is not too costly. We will not discuss them again.
Less obvious is the second point of proposition 1 that states that the steady state welfare
of the current young and all future generations is higher in case a binding minimum wage is
in place. The reason, intuitively, is as follows.
Under dynamic eﬃciency, the welfare of the current young and all future generations is
increasing in the steady state capital stock.12 It follows that a binding minimum wage has a
positive impact on workers’ steady state welfare because, by raising their permanent income
and savings, it fosters capital accumulation and eventually leads to a higher steady state
capital stock.
Of course, the introduction of a binding minimum wage generates ineﬃciencies that prevent
output to be maximized. The fall in production is, however, decreasing in the home production
productivity U. Therefore, if U is not too low, the negative eﬀect of labour market distortions
does not oﬀset the positive eﬀect of a higher capital stock. Thus, young agents manipulate
factor prices and achieve a higher steady state welfare despite the ineﬃciencies introduced in
the labour market.
Finally, let us brieﬂy discuss the implications of restricting agents to choose over constant
policies at time zero. This assumption implies that agents do take into account the future,
albeit in a speciﬁc way. They expect next period policy (the wage rate) to vary 1:1 with
the current policy. In the terminology of Krusell et al. (1997), this implies that the policy
outcome function, i.e. the function describing the law of motion of the policy variable, takes
the simple form wt+1 = wt, instead of the more general formulation wt+1 = Ψ(wt), where the
wage at time t+1 depends on the previous period wage through the (unknown) function Ψ(·).
It follows that
∂wt+1
∂wt = 1 > 0 in the ﬁrst case, and
∂wt+1
∂wt = Ψ0(wt) in the second. In words,
restricting the choice to a constant policy sequence implies that an increase in the current
wage induces a rise in next period wage as well (at a rate equal to 1), hence it generates a
beneﬁt in the ﬁrst part of life and a cost in the second. Would that be true also in the case
of sequential voting, i.e. would Ψ0(wt) > 0? In this simple OLG framework the answer is
positive. An increase in period t minimum wage raises current savings and the next period
capital stock. In turn, a larger capital stock in t + 1 raises the demand for the minimum
wage as it makes labour income yt+1(wt+1,Kt+1) more responsive to changes in the wage
(see equation (7)). This means that Ψ0(wt) is positive. Thus, also under sequential voting a
(marginally) larger wage has a positive impact on the well-being of the agents when young
and a negative impact on their well-being when old.
12For a formal proof see, e.g., Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (1996) pages 164-167.
143.2 The full-blown model: a numerical analysis
In this section we provide a numerical characterization of the full-blown version of the model
that allows for a general CRRA utility function (φ 6= 1), and relaxes the conditions that it is
only the young who receive labour income (λ < 1) and only the old who own capital (ψ > 0).
The aims of this exercise are twofold. First, the numerical analysis provides a robustness
check of the results obtained under less general parametric assumptions; second, it gives a
ﬂavour of the quantitative size of the eﬀects for reasonable parameter values.
Calibration. With respect to demographics, as in Auerbach and Kotlikoﬀ (1987) and R´ ıos-
Rull (1996), agents are assumed to be born at age 20 and die at age 73, so that each period
lasts 27 years. Moreover, following R´ ıos-Rull (1996), we assume that agents retire at age 65.
Thus, agents work 27 years when young (from age 20 to age 46) and 19 years when old (from
age 47 to 65) implying that the amount of labour supplied when old is 70.37% of the amount
supplied when young: (1 − λ)/λ = 19/27 = 0.7037. This sets λ = 0.5870.
The discount rate is θ = 0.3436 which implies an annual discount rate of 0.01, close to
the estimate of 0.011 of Hurd (1989). The depreciation rate is δ = .7497, which gives a
depreciation of 0.05 on a yearly basis (R´ ıos-Rull, 1996). We set α, the political power of
the young, equal to 0.5 meaning that the old and the young have the same political power,
consistently with the fact that in the model there is an identical mass of young and old
individuals. The share of capital in aggregate income in the perfectly competitive case is set,
following Bertola (1996), equal to 0.4.
There are three remaining crucial parameters to calibrate. The ﬁrst is U, the wage earned
when unemployed, which we interpret as home production. Gronau (1980) estimates the value
of home production for U.S. wives. He ﬁnds that it exceeds 70% of the family’s money income
after taxes, ignoring the value of home production due to the work at home of the husband.
Given the small number of hours husbands report they work at home, it seems reasonable to
set U equal to 80% of the competitive wage rate.
The second crucial parameter is ψ the parameter which measures the parent’s concern
about leaving bequests to her children. A study by Gale and Scholz (1994) uses direct data on
transfers and bequests in order to the compute the ﬂow of intergenerational wealth transfers.
Including trusts and life insurance in bequests from parents to children, the relative size
of bequests is 1.06% of total private wealth. Including also a half of gifts to children or
grandchildren in bequests from parents to children as disguised bequests, the relative size of
bequests becomes 1.22%. I use this number as a target variable in order to set ψ.
Finally, we need to choose a value for φ, the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion, which
governs the interest elasticity of savings and corresponds to the inverse of the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution. Direct estimates of the latter tend to fall in the range 0.1-0.67. This
evidence suggests a value of φ that varies from 10 to 1.5.13 We assume a value of 3 in our
13Using micro-data, Barsky et al. (1997) estimate an intertemporal elasticity of substitution of 0.18 implying
15Parameter Description Value Reference
Length of each period 27 years R´ ıos-Rull (1996)
Death Age 73 years R´ ıos-Rull (1996)
Retirement Age 65 years R´ ıos-Rull (1996)
λ Time endowment of the young 0.5870 R´ ıos-Rull (1996)
θ Time discount rate 0.3436 Hurd (1989)
δ Depreciation rate 0.7497 R´ ıos-Rull (1996)
α Political power of the young 0.5
γ Competitive capital share 0.4 Bertola (1996)
U Home production productivity 0.8 × wc Gronau (1980)
ψ Bequest concern 8e − 18 Gale and Scholz (1994)
1/φ Intertemporal elasticity of substitution 1/3 Attanasio et al. (1995)
Table 2: Parameter values in the baseline case
baseline calibration, but then also experiment with alternative values. Table 2 summarises
the parameter values in the baseline case.
Results. Table 3 reports the results for the baseline parametrisation. The ﬁrst column
reports the value of the risk aversion parameter φ. The second reports the ratio of the
regulated to the competitive steady state wage. A ratio larger than unity shows that a binding
minimum wage is implemented in steady state. In our baseline case, a binding minimum wage
φ wA/wc LS Ratio u KA/KF
3 1.0923 1.0327 0.1050 1.1160
Table 3: Baseline case: results for φ = 3
does arise in steady state and is 9.23% larger than the competitive wage. The implied labour’s
share is 3.27% larger than the labour’s share that would arise in the competitive steady state
(column 3). The distortion introduced in the labour market has two additional eﬀects. First,
column 4 shows that it generates a sizeable 10.5% unemployment rate; second, larger wages
allow to accumulate more capital. Column 5 shows that the capital stock in the regulated
steady state is 11.6% larger than the capital stock that would arise in the competitive steady
state. Overall, Table 3 suggests that for reasonable parameter values a binding minimum
wage is supported in steady state, with substantial eﬀects on factors’ shares, unemployment
and capital accumulation.
a coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion slightly above 5, while the estimates of Attanasio and Weber (1995) range
between 0.4 and 0.67 implying a coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion between 1.5 and 2.5. Using macro-data,
Hall (1988) concludes that the intertemporal elasticity of substitution (1/φ) is likely below 0.2.
16Let us brieﬂy discuss how the results depend (i) on the value of the intertemporal elasticity
of substitution; (ii) on the time-proﬁle of the labour supply; (iii) on the share of capital held
by the young.
Table 4 shows how the incentives to regulate the economy are aﬀected by the value of the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution. A binding minimum wage is supported in steady state
in the whole range of empirically plausible values of φ that, as reported above, go from 1.5 to
10. Notice that larger φ’s provide larger incentives to introduce a minimum wage. The reason
is clear. A value of φ larger than unity implies a negative interest elasticity of savings. Thus,
the larger φ the larger the increase in savings triggered by a drop in the interest rate. It follows
that a larger φ provides stronger incentives to regulate the labour market because it makes
its beneﬁcial side – the larger capital accumulation – bigger. In Table 4, it is also interesting
φ wA/wc LS Ratio u KA/KF
1 1.0000 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000
2 1.0134 1.0068 0.0214 1.0118
3 1.0923 1.0327 0.1050 1.1160
4 1.1597 1.0417 0.1390 1.2469
5 1.2145 1.0432 0.1492 1.3830
6 1.2556 1.0412 0.1471 1.5069
7 1.2838 1.0380 0.1391 1.6076
8 1.3016 1.0346 0.1292 1.6829
9 1.3123 1.0315 0.1195 1.7370
10 1.3187 1.0289 0.1108 1.7755
Table 4: Numerical results for φ ∈ [1,10]
to notice that while the steady state regulated wage and capital stock (columns 2 and 5) are
monotonically increasing in φ relative to their competitive counterparts, the unemployment
rate and the labour share start declining after a while (from φ ≥ 7). The reason is that for φ
large enough the increase in the capital stock more than oﬀsets the increase in the minimum
wage and raises both employment and GDP relative to labour income.
In the full-blown version of the model we have relaxed the condition that it is only the
young who receive labour income. This turns out to make it more likely that a binding
minimum wage is implemented in steady state. The obvious reason is that when also the
old receive labour income they are less adverse to an increase in the wage compared to the
case where they only receive capital income. This eﬀect more than oﬀsets the fact that with
λ < 1 the positive eﬀect of the minimum wage on capital accumulation is smaller. Finally,
by introducing bequests, we have allowed the young to have an empirically plausible share
of capital. A larger concern for leaving bequests to children, i.e. a larger ψ, reduces the
incentives to implement a binding minimum wage. The reason is that a larger minimum wage
17reduces the interest rate and the steady state bequests that agents leave (and receive).14
4 Capital markets integration
We now turn to a two-country world where capital is fully mobile, labour completely immo-
bile15 and countries strategically interact with each other.16
Under these assumptions, competition for the services of capital rule out symmetric reg-
ulated equilibria. The reason, very much as in a Betrand-like game, is that in each country
agents have incentives to slightly undercut the rival’s wage in order to attract foreign capital.
Whether a symmetric (fully competitive) or an asymmetric steady state arises depends
on the intensity of competition for capital which, in turn, depends on the elasticity of the
demand for capital (proof in appendix).
If the elasticity is large even small interest rate diﬀerentials generate large capital outﬂows.
Thus, the steady state is symmetric and no binding minimum wage is implemented in any
of the two countries, because any unilateral introduction of the wage ﬂoor is very costly due
to the large capital outﬂows. This implies that the open economy steady state wage is at
the competitive level in both countries. By symmetry, interest rates are also equal in both
countries and no capital ﬂows take place in steady state. Thus, the open economy symmetric
steady state fully replicates the closed economy competitive steady state. The lifetime utility
of the households is lower than in the closed economy case where a binding wage ﬂoor allows
to accumulate a larger capital stock.
Diﬀerently, if the demand for capital is relatively inelastic, capital ﬂows are relatively
small and labour market regulation, though more costly than in the closed economy case, is
still aﬀordable. The steady state equilibrium is asymmetric as one country has no binding
wage ﬂoor and full employment while the other retains a binding wage ﬂoor and unemploy-
ment. However, the beneﬁts of higher wages spill over to both countries thanks to the capital
movements that equalize factor prices.
The reason is that the unregulated country enjoys a positive interest rate diﬀerential with
respect to the regulated country and is therefore able to attract capital from abroad. Capital
keeps ﬂowing to the unregulated economy until its labour market becomes fully competitive.
This must be the case as, in the unemployment regime, the demand for capital is ﬂat and the
14Sensitivity analysis (available from the author) shows that the results hold good for a wide range of values
of ψ and λ. Similarly, analogous results obtain for diﬀerent values of the capital share γ.
15The assumption of no labour mobility is made for simplicity. Allowing for migration, while complicating
the analysis, does not change the result that globalisation reduces the incentives to regulate the labour market.
Labour mobility actually reinforces the incentives to deregulate the labour market because it triggers an inﬂow
of workers which increases the supply of labour and reduces labour income.
16An example of strategic interaction among countries can be found in the motivation of the rejection of
the Social Charter (adopted in 1989 by all other EEC member states) by the UK Prime Minister Mr. John
Major: “Europe can have the Social Charter. We shall have employment. [...] Let Jacques Delors accuse us of
creating a paradise for foreign investors; I am happy to plead guilty.” Cited in Rodrik (1997).
18interest rate is pinned down by the wage rate (see equation 8). Therefore capital ﬂows do
not arbitrage away the interest rate diﬀerential. Rather, they increase the capital stock and
shift the labour demand up until the minimum wage becomes non binding and the economy
gets back to perfect competition. When this happens the gap between the regulated and
unregulated country interest rates gets instantaneously closed and the capital ﬂows stop.
Since interest rates are back in line, the capital stock per worker K/N and the wage rate w
must be equalized as well.
However, capital per capita17 must be larger in the country where there are no unemployed
workers, implying that GDP per capita in that country is larger as well. The reason is that
labour market distortions have been wiped away by capital inﬂows and full-employment has
been restored in that country.18 Summing up, in the unregulated country the rise of the capital
stock allows the labour market to clear and the minimum wage to become non binding. Thus,
in the unregulated open economy there is full-employment and no ineﬃciencies arise. This,
combined with the fact that the stock of capital per worker K/N is identical in the two
countries implies that both the stock of capital per capita and GDP per capita are larger
in the unregulated economy. In other words, GDP per capita is larger in the unregulated
economy because capital ﬂows allow the unemployed to get back to work and the economy to
get rid of the deadweight loss due to the binding minimum wage.19
Therefore, in steady state the unregulated country enjoys capital inﬂows that raise the
competitive wage up to the regulated level. The latter is, however, lower than the closed
economy level and decreases as the elasticity of the demand for capital grows larger.20 Hence,
the steady state lifetime utility of the households in the regulated country is always lower than
the steady state closed economy level because of the larger cost of labour market regulation.
The unregulated country households, however, may be better oﬀ if the elasticity of the demand
for capital is low enough because this implies that the regulated country wage ﬂoor (and
consequently their wage level) is large enough.
Summarizing, capital markets integration provides incentives to reduce labour market
regulation because of its larger cost due to the capital outﬂows. If the elasticity of the demand
for capital is large, this is enough to warrant reversion to perfect competition in both countries.
17Capital per capita, i.e. capital per young household, is diﬀerent from the capital-to-labour ratio, i.e. capital
per worker, whenever there is unemployment.
18GDP per worker remains identical in the two countries. Capital ﬂows raise capital per capita while leaving
capital per worker unchanged.
19The same mechanism is at work in the case of a small open economy that is able to undercut the foreign
regulated wage (and enjoy capital inﬂows) without triggering any reaction from the rest of the world. A small
open economy enjoys the same wage level as the rest of the world (only ε-smaller) without suﬀering from
unemployment thanks to capital inﬂows it attracts. However, if the rest of the world is perfectly competitive,
the small open economy case is equivalent to the case of two countries strategically interacting with each other
with a highly elastic demand for capital, as upon integration the small country reverts to perfect competition.
20In particular, the regulated country wage and capital stock approach the competitive levels as the elasticity
grows large, and the closed economy (regulated) levels as the elasticity becomes small (see appendix for details).
19Otherwise, the steady state equilibrium is asymmetric with the unregulated country enjoying
full unemployment with a wage between the competitive level and the autarchic regulated
level. From a quantitative point of view, it is interesting to remark that numerical simulations
(not reported for brevity) show that for plausible parameter values (i.e. for φ between and 2
and 10 and for values of the other parameters as in table 2) asymmetric equilibria never arise.
Proposition 2. Perfect capital mobility lowers the incentives to regulate the labour market.
Despite the eﬃciency gains, the steady state lifetime utility of households may not increase.
4.1 Discussion of extensions
As this model is highly stylised, it is worth discussing the role of two assumptions: the absence
of policy instruments other than the wage and the focus on steady states.
More than one policy instrument. In this paper, the wage rate is the only policy in-
strument considered. This is a limitation that needs to be discussed. A natural option, for
instance, is to consider the role of a savings subsidy, as this instrument may be combined with
capital market integration to make agents internalize the externality on capital accumulation.
Imagine that upon opening the borders each country has to decide both over labour
market regulation and a savings subsidy ﬁnanced via taxes on labour income. How does a
(symmetric) equilibrium characterise in a context where countries strategically interact among
each other? Very much as in the previous analysis, countries have incentives to raise their
interest rate slightly above the rival’s level in order to attract capital. This triggers a race
that reduces labour market regulation and raises savings subsidies. The race stops only when
the after-tax minimum wage becomes equal to the reservation wage U. To be more precise,
the minimum wage will be set at a non-binding level and therefore the gross wage rate will be
at the competitive level; the after-tax wage will be driven down to the reservation wage level
U by the labour income taxes needed to ﬁnance the savings subsidy. Thus, after-tax wages
are smaller (and interest rates larger) than in the no-subsidy case.
In this symmetric case, in equilibrium factor prices are equalised and capital does not
ﬂow across borders. However, savings and the capital stock may go up or down relative to
the closed economy case depending on the interest elasticity of savings. As discussed above,
estimates of the inverse of the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution – that governs the
interest elasticity of savings – tend to fall in the range 0.1-0.67. This evidence suggests that
the interest rate elasticity is negative,21 and implies that savings and the capital stock decrease
further down when savings subsidies are allowed for.
Thus, the pattern of labour market regulation and savings does not change when one
allows for savings subsidies, i.e. openness still reduces the incentives to regulate the labour
21Direct estimates of the interest rate elasticity range from negative, insigniﬁcant or trivially small (see e.g.
Blinder, 1981; Blinder and Deaton, 1985; Bosworth and Burtless, 1992; Hall, 1988; Skinner and Feenberg,
1990) to quite large (Boskin, 1978 found the elasticity to be around 0.4).
20market and reduces the pace of capital accumulation.
It would also be interesting to analyse the joint eﬀects of labour market regulation and
other policy tools (e.g. government debt, pension systems). We would also like to have the
degree of capital market integration endogenously determined. These extensions would be
of obvious policy relevance and would allow to shed light on the pattern of complementar-
ity/substitutability between diﬀerent policies and their eﬀect on capital accumulation and on
the reward of the factors of production. However, their breadth lies beyond the scope of this
paper and we leave it for future research.
Transition. As we do not solve for the transition and compare welfare across steady-states,
one may wonder whether capital market integration may aﬀect the welfare of initial genera-
tions during the transition to the new steady state diﬀerently compared with the welfare of
future generations close to the new steady state. Let us discuss again the symmetric case
which is the one more likely to arise under plausible parameter values. The intuitive answer
is that, along the transition path, capital market integration indeed reduces the welfare of all
future generations, except the current old one. The mechanism is as follows. Upon integration
the wage drops to the competitive level while the capital stock is still at its regulated steady
state level. Given that level of capital, the young are either on the upward sloping part of
their value function (α < 1) or at the top (α = 1), which implies that a decrease in the
wage rate harms them. Globalisation drives the wage away from the level that maximises the
well-being of the ﬁrst young generation and reduces their welfare. Thus, despite the eﬃciency
gains, even the ﬁrst young generation loses from capital market integration, though less than
the generations that are closer to the new steady state who earn an even lower (competitive)
wage because of capital decumulation.
5 Final Remarks
This paper analyses the long-run eﬀects of capital markets integration explicitly accounting
for its impact on labour market regulation. We do so within a two-country OLG model where
labour market institutions are modelled as a wage ﬂoor and rational individuals choose labour
market policies taking into account both the dynamic eﬀects on capital accumulation and the
interaction with capital mobility.
We ﬁrst provide conditions for the minimum wage to arise in the closed economy steady
state. The ﬁrst requirement is dynamic eﬃciency. The reason is that (for plausible parameter
values) larger wages spur capital accumulation while dynamic ineﬃciency already implies over-
accumulation. The second condition involves the size of the production losses generated by
the minimum wage. The third requires workers to have enough political power. For reasonable
parameter values, binding minimum wages are supported in steady state generating a 10.5%
unemployment rate.
21We then allow capital to move across borders at no cost in a two-country setting. We
assume that countries strategically interact among each other and play a non-cooperative
game. We show that capital markets integration always provides incentives to reduce labour
market rigidities and restore labour market eﬃciency.
Two equilibrium conﬁgurations can arise in steady state, depending on the elasticity of the
demand of capital. A large elasticity generates ﬁerce competition and induces a symmetric
equilibrium with both countries’ wages at their competitive level. When the elasticity of
the demand for capital is low, an asymmetric equilibrium arises where one country has no
binding wage ﬂoor and full employment, while the other country retains a binding wage ﬂoor
and unemployment. In both cases, openness always reduces labour market regulation but
does not necessarily increase the steady state lifetime utility of the households as the drop in
the labour share slows down capital accumulation.
It is worth pointing out that, for simplicity, we have purposefully left out of the picture
important features of the real economies that make economic integration beneﬁcial, such as
international trade, labour mobility and, particularly in this framework, policy coordination.
Therefore, the goal of this paper is not to suggest that openness is harmful. Rather, it is to
highlight a simple channel through which the long run positive eﬀects of economic integration
may be partly dissipated if uncoordinated policies are implemented. Whether this provides
incentives to delegate policies to supranational authorities is left for future research.
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25A Proofs
Lemma 1.
Proof. Item 1 of the lemma derives directly from imposing the steady state condition Kt+1 = Kt on the law


















Item 2 is proved by imposing the steady state condition Kt+1 = Kt on the law of motion of the economy








γ (w − U)
Simple algebra shows that K
































In order to show that K




























and negative for w >
U
1−γ, it follows that K





















γ (w − U)
i2 ≥ 0










Proof. In order to identify the conditions under which a conﬂict of interests between the young and the old
takes place, we need to analyse their preferences over the set of feasible wages. A binding minimum wage is
feasible if, once chosen, it will be binding also in steady state. The feasibility condition is needed because of
the assumption that a constant wage w is voted upon.
1. Feasible wages. A binding minimum wage set at time 0 is feasible if it will be binding also in steady
state, i.e. if on top of being (weakly) larger than the going competitive wage w
c (K0) (and of the






set of feasible wages Ω(K0) is given by:
Ω(K0) =
n






















for K0 < K
F
w ≥ w
c (K0) for K0 ≥ K
F
)
In words. If K0 < K




is feasible. This is because if K0 < K
F the economy
converges to K









feasible because it will be eventually non binding. Diﬀerently, if K0 ≥ K
F, a wage w is feasible only
if w ≥ w




. Notice that the latter inequalities imply that the economy converges to
K
A (w) ≥ K
F and that K0 < b K (w). Moreover, from Lemma 1, K
A (w) ≤ b K (w). Now observe that
22Another way of seeing it is that there is no capital stock such that the wage ﬂoor is not binding, i.e. @Kt
such that Kt < b K (w),∀Kt ∈ K(K0,w).




. This further implies that Kt ≤ b K (w) ∀t, which means
that a minimum wage w ≥ w
c (K0) is (weakly) larger than the competitive market-clearing wage in each
period, thus also in steady state, meaning that it is feasible. The set of feasible wages is depicted in





narrower and the schedule w
y (K0,U) shifts down. At U = U the only point contained in the interval is
K
F and w











∂ ln(1 + r(w))
∂w
< 0
thus, they would always implement the lowest possible wage, i.e. the competitive wage.
3. Preferences of the young and conﬂict of interest. Given the existing capital stock K0, the most
preferred wage of the young is given by:
w




Therefore, a conﬂict of interest between the young and the old exists whenever the young are willing to
raise the wage above the level preferred by the old and the chosen wage is feasible. Given the previous









|w=wc(K0) > 0 if K0 > K
F (18)
(a) Consider ﬁrst the case K0 ≤ K
F. In case of a binding minimum wage, the derivative with respect

















γ (w − U) + U
K0






























KF and from Lemma 1 we know that
wc(KF)
(2+θ) = K
F), we can claim that equa-




if and only if
K0 ≥ K0 (U) ≡
U
2+θ









Now we have to make sure that 0 < K0 (U) ≤ K
F. First, notice that K0 (U) > 0 if and only if


















Second, K0 (U) ≤ K
F if and only if













1 + r(wc (KF))
!










> 0, i.e. if the economy is
dynamically eﬃcient.
Summarizing, in the case K0 ≤ K










K0 ≥ K0 (U)
23The analysis of the second order condition is in the proof of lemma 3.
27However, notice also that, by construction, U is such that K0 (U) = K
F if U = U, and therefore




|K0=KF ,w=wc(KF) ≥ 0 ⇐⇒
(
U ≥ U
K0 ≥ K0 (U)
This is so because U = U implies that K0 = K
F = K0 (U) and, from equations (19) and (20),
∂V y(w;K0)
∂w = 0. Moreover, U > U implies that K0 > K0 (U), being
∂K0(U)
∂U < 0 as shown below,
and therefore again from equations (19) and (20)
∂V y(w;K0)
∂w > 0.
Hence, a further necessary and suﬃcient condition (which will turn out to be useful later on) for



































U→U+ K0 (U) = +∞
K0 (U) |U=wc(KF) =
1









1 + r(wc (KF))
(b) Consider now the case K0 > K
F. A conﬂict of interest exists if w
y (K0) > w
c (K0). The derivative
of the value function of the young, evaluated at w = w

















U − (1 − γ)(1 − γ)K
γ
0





1 + r(wc (K0))
￿
(22)










γ (1 − γ)K
γ
0




From the previous item of this proof we know that, if U > U, then
∂V y
∂w |w=wc(K0) > 0, evaluated
at K0 = K
F. What if K0 > K
F? Notice that the above RHS is increasing in K0, while the LHS





γ ) and then decreasing. Therefore,
∂V y(w;K0)
∂w must
eventually become negative, since the RHS increases and the LHS will eventually decrease.
Hence, in the case K0 > K
F, if U > U , there is a K0 (U) > K





a conﬂict of interest exists.
24 By totally diﬀerentiating 23, it is straightforward to
check that
∂K0(U)
∂U > 0. See picture 1.
We have established that, given dynamic eﬃciency, necessary and suﬃcient conditions for a conﬂict to



















|K0=KF ,w=wc(KF) > 0
In ﬁgure 1 as U → U, the schedule w
















∂w |K0=KF ,w=wc(KF)= 0.
Finally, is dynamic ineﬃciency suﬃcient for no conﬂict to arise? The answer is positive. To prove it,







1−γ denotes the golden rule capital stock that maximizes
24Given the behavior of the RHS and the LHS the threshold must also be unique.
28aggregate steady state consumption in the competitive economy. Notice that K
F = K
GR ⇔ γ =
δ
2+θ+δ.
Evaluating (22) at w




















γ (1 − γ)K
γ
0
1 + r(wc (K0))
￿










































γ (1 − γ)K
γ
0
1 + r(wc (K0))
(2 + θ)K0U − (2 + θ)K0 (1 − γ)
2 K
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0 + 2 + θ
U
1 − γ













U = (1 − γ)K
γ
0






collapses into a singleton and therefore U = U =
w
c (K0). Of course, if K0 > K















are empty and no conﬂict arises.
Lemma 3. The minimum wage e w(K0;U,α) = argmaxw∈Ω(K0) W (w;K0) is such that:
1. e w(K0;U,α) is non decreasing in K0, U and α and it is bounded from above by the monopoly union wage
U
1−γ.
2. There exists a threshold level of the political power of the workers α(U), such that, if α > α(U), there
















Proof. 1. We characterize the interior solution of the problem maxw∈Ω(K0) W (w;K0), which delivers the
binding regulated wage, as a function of K0, α and U. The political aggregator (16) is readily rewritten,
neglecting constant terms, as follows:





































































1 + r(e w)
= 0 (26)




such there is conﬂict for K0 < K
F. Hence we just need to show that there is no conﬂict also for K0 ≥ K
F.
26It is always the case that
∂V y
∂w < 0 if K
F > K
GR (keeping K0 = K
GR) since in that case the labour income
share 1 − γ is even larger.
29Inspection of (26) ensures that any critical point e w is smaller than
U
1−γ if α < 1 and θ is ﬁnite. The
intuition is that a wage equal to
U
1−γ maximizes the utility of the young only if they do not care about
the future, i.e. θ → ∞. Hence, it can be a maximum of the political aggregator only if α = 1 and
θ → ∞. Otherwise, e w(K0,U,α) <
U
1−γ.


































(1 + r(e w))
2 (27)
Clearly (27) is negative, making sure that no critical point is a minimum. Being W (w;K0) a continuous
function, if an interior maximum e w(K0,U,α) exists, it is unique.
If
∂W(w;K0,U)









, the political aggregator is
decreasing in w and the competitive wage is implemented (corner solution).


















2 > 0 (28)
which is positive being
∂2W
∂w2 |w=wc < 0 (by (27)) and e w(K0,U,α) <
U
1−γ.












γ (y (e w;K0))
2 > 0




2. Under which conditions does the above described interior maximum exists? Intuitively, in the range of
U and K0 where a conﬂict exists, the political aggregator must have an interior maximum if α is large
enough. Of course, if α = 1 then e w(K0,U,α) = w
y (K0,U). Let us then ﬁnd a lower bound for α, such
that the interior maximum exists.
Since a conﬂict exists if and only if
∂V y(w;K0)
∂w |K0=KF ,w=wc(KF) > 0 (under dynamic eﬃciency, see
lemma 2), we check the condition under which the derivative of the political aggregator (26) is positive,
evaluated at w = w




















1 + r(wc (KF))
> 0
which is true if





(2 + θ)KF (U−(1−γ)wc(KF))
γwc(KF) (1 + r(wc (KF))) + θwc (KF)
(29)


























picture 2). Of course the two sets are equal if and only if α = 1. It is immediate to check that the lower





. The same happens if U goes down.
Proposition 1.
Proof. We ﬁrst prove the existence and uniqueness of the steady state wage w
A (U,α) and then show that the










Part 1. Figure 3 depicts both the economic and the political equilibria. The unique steady state lies at the
crossing point between the economic equilibrium K
A (w) and the political equilibrium e w(K,U,α).
Notice that the schedule K








since, if the competitive wage is
30implemented, the economic equilibrium implies that the capital stock is at the competitive level. Moreover,




, the function K
A (w) lies above the dotted-dashed line that delimits the set of feasible
wages, because along the K
A (w) schedule any K ≥ K
F is an unemployment equilibrium in which w ≥ w
c (K).
In words, w is larger than the competitive wage implied by the capital stock K
A (w) represented by the









is non empty, (i) that the K
A (w) and e w(K,U,α) must cross and (ii) that both the
steady state wage and the capital stock are larger than the competitive ones.
27
Part 2. The steady state welfare of the young is given by
V
y (w,K (w)) = lnc
y (w,K (w)) +
1
1 + θ




lny (w,K (w)) +
1
1 + θ



























∂w ≥ 0 for w ≤
U



























we know that at w = w
A the FOC (26) must hold, and therefore if α < 1 it must be the case that
∂V y(w,K(w))
∂w |w=wA > 0, because the young are always willing a larger wage than the society as a whole.
However, since the SOC (27) is negative at any w that satisﬁes the FOC, making sure that the function
∂V y(w,K(w))
∂w does not cross the zero threshold from below, it must be the case that
∂V y(w,K(w))




















Lemma 4. There exists a level of γ, call it γ
∗(θ,δ,U), such that below γ
∗ the steady state equilibrium is
symmetric and above γ
∗ it is asymmetric.
Proof. What are the conditions under which a competitive and symmetric steady state may emerge in the
open economy? To answer this question, we analyse the incentives of the young to raise the wage above the
competitive level, when the foreign regulated wage is ﬁxed at the competitive level (both countries are in steady
state).
If the domestic country raises the wage above the foreign level, capital outﬂows take place until the rate
of remuneration of capital is equal in the two countries and the eﬀective (as opposed to the regulated) foreign
wage, denoted by b w
∗, equals the domestic regulated level, i.e. b w
∗ = w. For this to happen, an amount of
capital equal to b K
∗ − s
∗
0 ﬂows from the domestic to the foreign country, where s
∗
0 denotes the stock of savings
accumulated in the foreign country and b K
∗ the level of capital such that foreign eﬀective wage equals the
regulated domestic level, i.e. b w
∗ = w.
From the ﬁrst order conditions of the ﬁrm, imposing that the labour market clears, i.e. N = 1, the demand






1−γ . If the domestic wage is larger than the foreign level, then r < r
∗. Thus,













Notice that the elasticity of the demand for capital is
1
γ. Hence, the lower γ the more costly to regulate the
domestic labour market in terms of capital outﬂows.
27Given their shapes, e w(K,U,α) and K
A (w) must cross only once. Uniqueness may also be demonstrated
by showing that the mapping of w on itself, i.e. the function e w(K (w);.) admits at most one ﬁxed point,
because at any ﬁxed point
∂ e w(K(w);.)
∂w < 1.
31We are now in the position to analyse the maximization problem of a domestic young agent:
V



























K = s0 −
￿
b K











Substituting the constraints in the objective function, we get:
V
































































































∂w at a competitive steady state with K = K








































































c (1 − γ)) −
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F is decreasing in γ as the competitive






1−γ (and therefore also the competitive steady state wage
w




) goes to zero when γ approaches one, because the term
1−γ
2+θ is smaller than one
and
1
1−γ goes to inﬁnity.
322. If γ equals the golden rule level γ = γ
GR ≡
γ
2+θ+δ, we know that in the closed economy case
∂V y(w;K)
∂w = 0
evaluated at K = K
F = K
GR and w = w
c (see proof of lemma 2). It follows that in the open economy
case it must be that
∂V y(w;K0)
∂w < 0, because of the extra negative term. By continuity for γ slightly
larger than the golden rule level,
∂V y(w;K)
∂w < 0 as well.
3. If γ gets close to one the term −
￿
(w







goes to zero because:
(a) The diﬀerence (w
c − U) vanishes as the term (w
c − U) cannot become negative (U acts as a wage
ﬂoor, thus U ≤ w
c), and w





1−γ goes to zero, thus w
c − U = max(w
c − U,0).





























which goes to zero when γ approaches one, because the term
1−γ




Thus, there must exist a level of γ, call it γ
∗ (θ,δ,U) > γ
GR, such that if [0,γ
∗] the equilibrium is symmetric
while above γ
∗ the equilibrium is asymmetric.
Notice that if γ = γ
∗ a competitive steady state equilibrium obtains in both countries and the lifetime
utility of the households is lower than in the closed economy case in both countries. By continuity, in the
unregulated country, the lifetime utility of the households is lower than in the closed economy case also for γ
slightly larger than γ
∗. On the other side, if γ is close enough to one, the unregulated country enjoys the same
wage as in the closed economy without suﬀering from unemployment. Therefore, in this case, the steady state
lifetime utility of the households must be larger than in the closed economy.
Finally, the steady state lifetime utility of the households in the regulated country is always lower than in
the closed economy because of the capital ﬂows associated to labour market regulation.
33B Figures





preferred by the young, denoted by wy (K0,U), is larger than the (dashed-dotted) competitive










Figure 2: Autarchic Political Equilibrium. Solid line: economy preferred wage
e w(K0,U,α) as a function of the capital stock. Dashed-dotted line: minimum feasible constant
wage implementable. Autarchic politico-economic equilibrium
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